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Conventional wisdom has it that political parties have incentives to respond to public opinion. It 
is also conventional wisdom that in open economies, policymakers must also “respond” to mar-
kets. Research on representation has provided ample evidence in support of the first claim. Re-
search on the political economy of globalization has not, however, provided evidence for the 
second. This article examines the effects of globalization on how parties respond to voters. We 
argue that while elections motivate parties to respond to public sentiment, economic interde-
pendence distracts political elites from their electorates and towards market actors, reducing 
party responsiveness to the mean voter. Evidence from a pair of distinct data sources spanning 
elections in twenty advanced capitalist democracies from the 1970s to 2010 shows that while 
parties have incentives to respond to Left-Right shifts in the mean voter position, they only do so 
when the national economy is sufficiently sheltered from the world economy. These findings 
have implications for party strategies, for representation, and for the broader effects of market 
integration. 
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Representative democracy means that voters choose leaders to represent them in substan-
tive terms (Pitkin 1967). In recent years several studies have put this evaluative standard to the 
test. Many examine the extent to which political parties respond to public preferences. On this 
point, the weight of the evidence finds that parties in industrialized democracies are responsive to 
the public’s preferences (Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson1995; Powell 2000; McDonald and 
Budge 2005; Soroka and Wlezien 2010), even in light of the multitude of factors pulling political 
actors in different directions (Tavits 2007; Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009; Meguid 2008). And 
while the penchant of representatives to respond to public demands may be shaped in part by 
electoral rules, party system polarization, party type, and the like, most studies conclude that, 
ultimately, democracy works.  
Though edifying, this conclusion may ring hollow for citizens in many advanced capital-
ist democracies today. As then-Shadow Chancellor Harold Wilson’s disparaging reference to 
financiers as “gnomes of Zurich,” implies, politicians in western democracies both in and (as in 
Wilson’s case) out of government have long struggled with how to balance public demands with 
the pressures of the market. In the 1970s, for instance, financial markets were hedging against 
Sterling as the British economy fell into recession. Pressed between fulfilling campaign promises 
to increase spending and requirements for receiving loans from the International Monetary Fund, 
the Government chose the latter.  In France, the Socialist Party was swept to power in the 1980s 
with a mandate for nationalization and redistribution. Yet less than two years later President Mit-
terrand backtracked on the policies preferred by the public and embarked on a policy regime of 
rigueur to bring the economy in line with global capitalism. Since the 1970s and 1980s market 
dependencies have multiplied and deepened. In Greece, a Socialist-led government in 2009 began 
a process of rolling back the generous welfare state protections and entitlements popular with 
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most of the electorate. In Ireland, the implosion of an asset bubble has required politicians to be-
come attentive to bond ratings—and arguably so against the wishes of the median voter. And in 
Italy, attempts to dismiss the government were initially stymied. At the time, observers credited 
Prime Minister Berlusconi’s temporary survival not to the popularity of his policies with Italian 
voters but to fears of speculation by globally-minded financial market actors. These examples 
and many others highlight instances where politicians face a choice between responding to voters 
and “responding” to markets.  
The political implications of market dependence have not gone unnoticed. Many studies 
examine the consequences for policy outcomes like taxes, interest rates, or spending. Others per-
tain to economic performance outcomes, like income levels, or to policy preferences. And some 
consider how globalization affects political parties. Haupt (2010) examines economic openness 
and parties’ policy positions, but this study does not explicitly account for shifts in the position of 
the median voter and how these shifts influence party positions. Adams, Haupt, and Stoll (2009) 
concentrate on left parties. They highlight the ‘ideological’ character and ‘long-term policy orien-
tations’ of these parties and are thus unaffected by the position of the median voter or by globali-
zation, and are influenced instead by their members. Ward, Ezrow, and Dorussen (2011) empha-
size that the influence of globalization on parties’ policy positions is conditional on the position 
of the median voter: that parties will adopt more rightward positions due to globalization, but 
only when the median voter is to the left.  None of these studies, however, examine the critical 
questions of whether and how global economic ties influence party responsiveness to changes in 
voter preferences.  When public opinion provides one signal and the global economy another, 
how do elites respond? Indeed, little research systematically examines the existence and the ex-
tent of this Catch-22. We are aware of only one study—Broz and Hawes’ (2006) study of Con-
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gressional voting as a function of “pro-globalization” constituency preferences—which bears 
directly on the issue of political representation. 
This oversight may have much to do with a now-conventional understanding that closer 
ties to global markets need not compromise the actions of democratically-elected governments 
(e.g., Basinger and Hallerberg 2004; Clark 2003; Garrett 1998; Steinmo 2010; Swank 2002). 
Studies in the tradition of international and comparative political economy typically have public 
policy as the outcome of interest. Policy outcomes are important for understanding political con-
trol in global markets. Attention to policy outcomes, however, may well come at the expense of 
understanding whether and how ties to global markets influences a more fundamental tenet of 
representative democracy, i.e., the responsiveness of political parties to the public.  
In this study we examine the effects of economic globalization on domestic politics. Our 
focus, however, is not on the effects of openness on government policy choices but on the posi-
tion-taking strategies of political parties. We ask whether market integration compromises politi-
cal parties with respect to their function of representing and expressing the political views of their 
electorates. We deliberately focus on the positions of political parties rather than the policies tak-
en by governments. Parties play a unique role in aggregating public preferences channeling them 
into national policy debates. Parties rank as democracy’s primary “channels of expression,” be-
cause they “are an instrument, or an agency, for representing people by expressing their de-
mands” (Sartori 1976, 27; italics original). 
In what follows, we develop an argument about the consequences of globalization for the 
behavior of competing parties. Party positions are influenced by a host of economic agents, rang-
ing from financial markets and producer groups to organized labor and consumers. With econom-
ic globalization, the range of these agents, as well as the range of pressures facing policymakers, 
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increases. Globalization matters for representation because it distracts the attention of politicians 
from citizens and towards market actors. As a consequence, we expect the influence of globaliza-
tion on representation through parties to be negative. Political parties should be less responsive to 
popular opinion when national economies are more exposed to world markets.  
This simple but untested claim is assessed in a pair of cross-national analyses, each based 
on a separate data source, covering different sets of elections and utilizing different measures for 
party policy positions.  In total, we consider connections between parties and voters in twenty 
developed democracies ranging from the mid-1970s to the late 2000s. We find that while parties 
respond to shifts in voter preferences, economic globalization reduces this responsiveness for 
parties with experience in government. Evidence supports the claim that exposure to trade and 
capital flows, as well as the consolidation of a liberal regime for international finance, suppresses 
party responsiveness to public opinion.  
 
Responding to Voter Preferences in World Markets 
We begin with the connections between party behavior and the wishes of the electorate.  
Previous research emphasizes the primacy of the median voter’s policy preference as the starting 
point for democratic representation (Downs 1957; Huber and Powell 1994; Stimson et al. 1995; 
Powell 2000; McDonald and Budge 2005).  Regardless of whether we assume them to be moti-
vated by votes, office, or policy, parties have incentives to react to changes in the preferences of 
the median voter. Analyses of party strategies in Western Europe regularly find parties to be 
vote-maximizing and center-oriented. These studies characterize parties as expanding their ideo-
logies in an attempt to appeal to a broader spectrum of the electorate. Even in instances where 
vote share maximization does not constitute the end goal in itself, it remains an efficient strategy 
 5
for office- and policy-seeking parties. In the former case, increasing vote share ceteris paribus 
enhances the party’s position for post-election coalition negotiations.2 And in the latter case, a 
credible assumption is that as a policy-seeking party’s electoral strength increases, it gains more 
leverage to pull the governing coalition’s policy in its preferred direction.3 In sum, be it for rea-
sons of power, policy, or both, elections provide parties with incentives to respond to changes in 
the preferences of the median voter.  
Globalization, however, complicates domestic politics. Much research finds this to be the 
case with reference to the effects of openness on social spending, tax policy, and the distribution 
of income (Jahn 2006; Busemeyer 2009; Bergh and Nilsson 2010; Plümper, Troeger, and Winner 
2009). A basis for this complexity stems from how globalization is interpreted by political actors.  
By producing a new economic environment among advanced industrial states, the depth of eco-
nomic integration can shift the focus of political actors from domestic to international issues. As 
Jahn (2006, 408) succinctly explains, “whereas domestic actors and conditions were the main 
reference points in the past, and international aspects were subordinated to domestic ones, this 
whole dynamic reversed in the period of increasing globalization: international factors became a 
major driving force for policy orientation and domestic factors became subordinated to them.”  
But just as globalization puts pressure on government actions, as others have argued, we 
maintain that it also complicates party competition. Consider once again parties’ policy, office, 
                                                 
2 Most of the political systems in the empirical analysis are multiparty and frequently yield coali-
tion governments.  
3 For example, Adams and Merrill’s (2009) study of parties’ strategies in multiparty systems con-
cludes that parties are motivated to adjust their policies in response to their beliefs about the me-
dian voter’s position, rather than in response to the diversity of voter ideologies.  
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and vote-based motivations.  In the closed economy setting, each of these motivations provides 
parties with incentives to respond to voter preferences. However, with increased globalization, 
the standard motivations of policy, office, and vote are no longer mutually reinforcing, Respond-
ing in kind to the preferences of the median voter may remain an effective vote maximizing strat-
egy, but only in the short term.  Under globalization, party actors must extend their attention be-
yond voters towards an expanded number of actors and a less certain policy environment.  Spe-
cifically, economic interdependence provides incentives for political elites to turn to market elites 
for knowledge and expertise on issues such as financial market regulations or shifting production 
centers. These elites, including international credit agencies, pension fund managers, and finan-
cial actors—are more informed than political elites (e.g., members of national legislatures) about 
how the world economy works.  As a consequence, market integration increases the relevance of 
transnationally mobile market actors and distracts political elites from their electorates.  
The influence exerted by market actors might be of little consequence if they held prefer-
ences identical to those of the median voter. But the weight of the evidence suggests otherwise. 
The preferences of unelected technocrats, such as those governing central banks, tend to prefer 
policies that privilege stability over short-term growth (cf Adolph 2013). World Bank researchers 
find that multinational corporations identify taxes and regulation as the greatest perceived obsta-
cles to operating in industrial economies (Batra, Kaufmann, and Stone 2004; Broz, Frieden, and 
Weymouth 2008).  Mosley (2003) demonstrates that the investment behavior of financial market 
participants is guided by a narrow range of indicators, chiefly public deficits and inflation rates. 
Issues which many voters care about, like public spending and labor market performance, are 
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widely viewed by these actors as unimportant.4 Sanders and Tóka’s (2013) examination of mass 
and elite opinion in 16 countries also points to a discrepancy in the views of voters and those of 
market actors.  They find that while the public at large favors a more social model for Europe, the 
preferences of economic elites (e.g., managers of top economic firms) come down squarely for an 
“Economically Competitive Model.”  
Figure 1 provides one illustration of the discrepancy between the ideological preferences 
of market elites relative to mass publics.  Collected by the IntUne project, the surveys gauge atti-
tudes of mass publics and economic elites, as provided by the opinions of managers of top eco-
nomic or financial firms, or representatives of major businesses.5 The figure compares these 
groups’ ideological tendencies by displaying differences in the mean left-right self-placements of 
voters versus those of economic elites.6 Ideology is scaled so that right wing positions are higher. 
Positive values thus indicate that, on average, voters are located to the left of economic elites in 
                                                 
4 This is consistent with Singer’s (2011) analysis of public opinion in 39 countries in which he 
find that less than 2% of those surveyed responded that taxes were the most important issue in 
their country. 
5 The website associated with the “Integrated and United? A Quest for Citizenship in an Ever 
Closer Europe (IntUne)” project is www.intune.it. For more details about the surveys, see Best et 
al. 2012; Sanders et al. 2012. We do not employ the IntUne data for subsequent analyses because 
it is cross-sectional, and our analysis of responsiveness requires time-series cross-sectional data.  
6 Data are displayed for those countries that overlap between the IntUne project and our empirical 
coverage below. 
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each of the ten countries that overlap with our study.7  With the exception of Italy, all of these 
differences are statistically significant. Moreover, they are substantively significant: in all coun-
tries (save Italy) the difference is greater than 0.5, and for Portugal, Belgium, Germany, and 
Denmark the mean ideological placements of economic elites are more than one full unit to the 
right of voters’ mean placements along the 0-10 left-right scale. And in every country, the prefer-
ences of managers and business representatives are well to the right of the mean voter position.  
Insomuch as evidence such as this indicates a divergence of preferences between voters and mar-
kets, then the party’s task of “channeling voter expression” (Sartori 1976) becomes even more 
difficult.8 
<Figure 1 about here> 
In sum, we argue that while elections motivate parties to respond to shifts in the mean 
voter position, economic interdependence distracts political elites from their electorates towards 
market actors, adding uncertainty to the political landscape. Hence, currying favor with markets 
does not aid but likely weakens party incentives to respond to shifting public preferences. This 
argument motivates our first hypothesis:  
                                                 
7 Hungary is the only country in the IntUne study for which voters are located to the right of eco-
nomic elites.  
8 If market and citizen interests diverge (which we find plausible), this obviously strengthens our 
argument. Nevertheless we note that it is not a necessary condition for our central prediction. If 
globalization increases the number of politically relevant actors, as we argue, this promotes 
greater uncertainty in the political landscape which also reduces the likelihood that parties will 
respond to the mean voter.    
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H1. Globalization Hypothesis: The responsiveness of political parties to the preferences of medi-
an voter is weaker as national economies become more exposed to world markets.  
Hypothesis 1 predicts that globalization conditions responsiveness.  These conditioning 
effects, however, are unlikely to confront all party competitors to the same degree. In multiparty 
democracies, many of the smaller and newer parties appeal to narrower segments of the electorate 
rather than to the mean voter. And many such parties have never had the responsibility of making 
actual policy. External considerations that could potentially influence policy, such as those aris-
ing from the world economy, are therefore less likely to play much—if any—role in the strategies 
of these parties. By contrast, for parties which have been saddled with the responsibility of gov-
erning, these considerations will be more salient. It may be that only after being in a position of 
leadership that party actors come to grips with the need to balance the preferences of the elec-
torate with those of other actors. We examine, therefore, whether the mediating effect of globali-
zation on party responsiveness to public opinion is more pronounced for parties with governing 
experience.  This produces a second hypothesis: 
H2. Governing Experience Hypothesis: The mediating effect of globalization on party respon-
siveness to public opinion is conditional on governing experience.  
 
Model, Data and Measures 
We evaluate these claims statistically by estimating a series of models examining the de-
terminants of party behavior.  If parties respond to the preferences of the mean (or median) vot-
er,9 then they should adjust their positions on the issues as a function of shifting voter prefer-
                                                 
9 The empirical literature on party responsiveness generally relies on the mean voter (e.g., Adams 
et al. 2006). We report below that the distribution of respondents’ self-placements on the 0-10 
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ences. Levels of globalization, however, should mediate this relationship. Accordingly we specify 
a basic model:  
ܲܽݎݐݕ ݄݂ܵ݅ݐ௝௞௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ ܱ݌݅݊݅݋݊ ݄݂ܵ݅ݐ௞௧ ൅ ߚଶܩ݈݋ܾ݈ܽ݅ݖܽݐ݅݋݊௞௧  (1) 
൅ ߚଷܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ ܱ݌݅݊݅݋݊ ݄݂ܵ݅ݐ௞௧ כ ܩ݈݋ܾ݈ܽ݅ݖܽݐ݅݋݊௞௧ ൅ ߝ௝௞௧ 
where ܲܽݎݐݕ ݄݂ܵ݅ݐ௝௞௧ is the change in the position of party j in country k at the current election t 
compared with its position at the previous election t-1. ܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ ܱ݌݅݊݅݋݊ ݄݂ܵ݅ݐ௞௧ is the change in 
the position of the mean voter in country k at election t compared with its position at election t-1. 
ܩ݈݋ܾ݈ܽ݅ݖܽݐ݅݋݊௞௧ is a measure of country k’s exposure to the international economy at time t, ߝ௝௞௧ 
is a disturbance, and the ߚs are parameters to be estimated.10 
Party policy positions have been measured using a variety of methods, including country 
expert assessments, assessments made by the electorate, and the coding of political party platforms. 
Examining the determinants of shifts in positions requires measures for a minimum of two 
consecutive election periods. This makes the use of expert assessments impractical. However, 
longitudinal measures based on the other two modes are available. We conduct two separate 
analyses. Our primary means of measuring party shifts is from statements from party platforms as 
provided by the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP, Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, Budge, and 
McDonald 2006). We pair these analyses with an ancillary analysis which employs a measure of 
party positions produced by individuals’ perceptions of the parties’ locations from public opinion 
surveys. While such multi-measure approaches are rare in cross-national research on representation, 
                                                                                                                                                              
point left-right scale is generally unimodal and symmetric, which suggests that the mean is a 
close approximation to the median. 
10  Note that while this specification assumes a particular causal pathway, implications of plausi-
ble alternative (endogenous) relationships are also considered in the online appendix.  
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our attention to the effects of globalization—a phenomenon which varies both across space and 
over time—makes this approach particularly attractive here. Results from each set of analyses point 
to the same conclusion.  
Party positions and voter preferences are measured in terms of “left” and “right.” The left-
right scale has three attractive qualities. First, it provides a common, well-understood language of 
policy preferences for which data are available both for party elites and masses. Second, more 
than any single issue, the left-right dimension captures the primary bases of political competition 
across the national settings (e.g., Huber and Powell 1994; Powell 2000; see also McDonald and 
Budge 2005). And third, in advanced capitalist democracies the substance of “left” and “right” 
aligns with preferences over the government’s role in the economy and the distribution of in-
come, issues which have ranked among the most salient to voters over the past thirty-plus years 
(Huber and Inglehart 1995; Warwick 2002).  
To capture important temporal changes in party position, we employ a panel of elections 
from eighteen countries ranging from 1977 to 2009. Comprised of the election manifestos from 
political parties in a wide range of democracies, these data provide the only cross-national esti-
mates of party policies available for an extended time period. And since the content of party pro-
grams is often the result of intense intra-party debate, the CMP estimates should be reliable and 
accurate statements about parties’ positions at the time of elections. Research has found these 
measures to be generally consistent with those from other party positioning studies, such as those 
based upon expert placements, citizen perceptions of parties’ positions, and parliamentary voting 
analyses (Hearl 2001; McDonald and Mendes 2001; Laver, Benoit, and Garry 2003; see also 
Marks 2007). We measure left-right positions using the additive measure advocated by Laver and 
Budge (1992). The measure has a possible maximum value of +100 (extreme right) and a mini-
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mum of -100 (extreme left). We rescale the measure onto a 0-10 scale. The dependent variable, 
ܲܽݎݐݕ ݄݂ܵ݅ݐ௝௞௧, is then measured as the change in party j’s position from election t-1 to t. 
Data on mean voter preferences come from a public opinion survey item that asks re-
spondents to place themselves on a left-right scale from 1 (left) to 10 (right).11 Data for most of 
the cases are from the Eurobarometer surveys: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United King-
dom.12 We augment this sample where possible with public opinion data for three other estab-
lished democracies, Australia, New Zealand, and Norway.13 Appendix A.1, available at on our 
website, reports countries, elections, and parties included in the analysis. 
                                                 
11 We recalibrate public opinion measures to fit on a 0-10 scale. 
12 The first elections covered by the Eurobarometer survey series were in 1973. For each country 
data from these first (t-1) election years are used to create the  ܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ ܱ݌݅݊݅݋݊ ݄݂ܵ݅ݐ௞௧ variable 
and thus do not make up an observation in the data set. The first election year included is 1977. 
Spain and Portugal were not included in the surveys until 1981 and 1986, respectively, and Aus-
tria, Finland and Sweden until 1995.  
13 Including (or excluding) these cases does not change the substantive findings, but it does help 
to broaden the sample beyond those cases included in the Eurobarometer files. Due to lack of 
recurrent public opinion surveys with the left-right placement measure, our sample does not in-
clude Canada, Japan, Switzerland, or the United States. The Australian data come from the Aus-
tralian Election Studies data from 1987 to 2007.  The New Zealand data are from the New Zea-
land Elections Study program for elections from 1990 to 2008. The Norwegian data in the analy-
sis are based on Norwegian Election Studies, 1973-2005. 
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For economic globalization we rely mainly on a general measure of country exposure to 
the world economy. The measure comes from the KOF Economic Globalization Index and com-
bines two aspects of economic globalization: actual flows plus the absence of restrictions (Dreher 
2006).14  By employing a broad indicator, we capture a range of signals pertaining to the world 
economy which may be received by strategic political parties. We report below additional anal-
yses in which we substitute with other, narrower, measures. Prior to estimation, we rescale the 
measure from 0-100 to 0-1 to facilitate model interpretation.15  
In order to control for the performance of the domestic economy, we include a measure of 
the shift in the annual per-capita growth rate from election t-1 to t.16 It has been shown that public 
support for more government policy—i.e., leftward shifts in policy positions—is greater during 
times of strong economic performance and declines during slow-downs (Stevenson 2001). Final-
ly, the longitudinal nature of these data also allows us to consider the role of parties’ past behav-
                                                 
14 The index comprised in half by flows (trade, foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, 
and income payments to foreigners) and half in terms of restrictions on movement (import barri-
ers, tariff rates, taxes on trade, and capital account restrictions).  See globalization.kof.ethz.ch for 
additional information. 
15 The sample mean is 0.79, and the standard deviation is 0.11, a minimum 0.52 (Italy 1979) and 
a maximum of 0.99 (Luxembourg 2004). 
16 Growth data is from the World Development Indicators. We also controlled for the shifts in 
unemployment and our substantive results remain unchanged. 
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ior on their current policy shifts. Inclusion of ܲܽݎݐݕ ݄݂ܵ݅ݐ௝௞௧ିଵ on the right-hand-side accounts 
for the possibility of policy alternation (Budge 1994).17 
 
Analysis and Results 
Baseline Analyses 
We estimate a series of models using OLS regression. By nesting parties within country-
elections, the structure of the data set gives rise to a pair of considerations which, if left un-
addressed, could lead to biased and inefficient parameter estimates. First, to eliminate bias from 
unmeasured country-level factors which are not uncorrelated with the other explanatory varia-
bles, models are estimated with a full set of country-fixed effects. Second, it is likely that elec-
tion-specific factors could affect all parties’ policy shifts, and this would produce correlated er-
rors among parties competing in the election. We address this concern by estimating 
heteroskedastic robust standard errors clustered by election period.   
Table 1 reports model estimates. Our theory suggests that the responsiveness of parties to 
public opinion is contingent on economic globalization. Model 1 reports results of estimating this 
                                                 
17 The inclusion of ܲܽݎݐݕ ݄݂ܵ݅ݐ௝௞௧ିଵ also has implications for inference. Given the structure of 
the data, serially correlated errors within countries is also a possibility. That is, the causal pro-
cesses which generate the party shift score at election t, could also be operating at election t-1. 
The lagged dependent variable addresses this possibility (Beck and Katz 2009). We note that 
while some caution against inclusion of lagged dependent variables in fixed effects models 
(Plümper et al. 2005), we opt to include the lagged dependent variable since it yields more con-
servative estimates.  We note, however, that the substantive results we report below are identical 
or stronger when ܲܽݎݐݕ ݄݂ܵ݅ݐ௝௞௧ିଵ is omitted. 
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interactive specification for all party shifts in our sample.  The estimate on 
ܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ ܱ݌݅݊݅݋݊ ݄݂ܵ݅ݐ௞௧ , which indicates the influence of public opinion on party shifts in a 
completely closed economy (ܩ݈݋ܾ݈ܽ݅ݖܽݐ݅݋݊௞௧ = 0), is positive but imprecisely estimated.  The 
estimate on the interaction term, ܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ ܱ݌݅݊݅݋݊ ݄݂ܵ݅ݐ௞௧ כ ܩ݈݋ܾ݈ܽ݅ݖܽݐ݅݋݊௞௧, while carrying the 
expected negative sign, is also not distinguishable from zero at conventional levels. These results 
do not provide support for the claim that parties are systematically responsive to public opinion, 
nor do they show that globalization mediates the relationship between left-right shifts in public 
opinion and shifts in all parties’ positions. Model 1 results do not support for our first hypothesis.  
Nonetheless, these results are illuminating: implications for the proposed mechanism can be 
explored by comparing estimates based on all parties to estimates based solely on parties with 
governing experience, namely, that the latter set of parties is more likely to have their attention 
diverted away from the wishes of the public when market integration increases.  
<Table 1 about here> 
The second hypothesis is that the constraining effects of globalization are more pro-
nounced for parties with governing experience. We therefore examine whether globalization con-
ditions the strategies of those parties which have played a leading role in policy formation. We 
distinguish these “governing parties” from others based on if they have ever been the largest 
partner in a governing coalition (i.e., the chief executive or prime ministerial party). To target 
main parties in policy formation, the second model in Table 1 re-estimates the model only for 
parties with governing experience.18  The last model reports parameter estimates using only those 
remaining parties without governing experience.   
                                                 
18 Parties with governing experience received an average vote share of 27%; the remaining par-
ties are much smaller, averaging 7% share of the vote. Note that we also estimated the model on 
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Results of these regressions highlight the importance of governing experience. In Model 
2, the estimate on ܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ ܱ݌݅݊݅݋݊ ݄݂ܵ݅ݐ௞௧ is positive and precisely estimated at ߚଵ = 3.65.  For 
the case of a closed economy (ܩ݈݋ܾ݈ܽ݅ݖܽݐ݅݋݊௞௧ = 0), the model predicts that a one unit shift in 
the mean voter’s left-right position causes the party’s position to shift over three units in the same 
direction.  Such a scenario, however, is purely hypothetical.  As shown by the negative estimate 
on ܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ ܱ݌݅݊݅݋݊ ݄݂ܵ݅ݐ௞௧ כ ܩ݈݋ܾ݈ܽ݅ݖܽݐ݅݋݊௞௧ (-4.55), the positive effect of public opinion on 
party behavior decreases as trans-border economic ties deepen.  Thus, for parties having experi-
enced the rigors of governing, their tendency to be responsive to the mean voter is tempered by 
the broader economic environment.  For completeness, Model 3 results show that parties that 
have not governed are neither responsive to public opinion nor are their position-taking strategies 
affected by globalization. The difference in the magnitude of the reported estimates on the inter-
action term in Models 2 and 3 is statistically significant.19  All told, these findings provide solid 
                                                                                                                                                              
parties with any sort of experience in government (chief executive or junior coalition partner).  
For this larger set of cases (n = 398), the parameter estimate on the interaction term is in the ex-
pected negative direction but does not attain statistical significance for any in-sample value of 
Globalization.   
19 To assess this, we estimated a model with all cases but with a three-way interaction variable: 
ܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ ܱ݌݅݊݅݋݊ ݄݂ܵ݅ݐ௞௧ כ ܩ݈݋ܾ݈ܽ݅ݖܽݐ݅݋݊௞௧ כ ܩ݋ݒ݁ݎ݊݅݊݃ ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௝௞௧. Results support the 
finding that the mediating effects of globalization are much stronger for parties with governing 
experience than for those without (the coefficient on triple interaction term is: -6.13; p = .001). A 
joint F test reveals that conditioning globalizations’ influence on party type in this way is also 
statistically significant (F = 4.07, p = 0.01).  
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support for The Governing Experience Hypothesis: the constraining effects of economic globali-
zation are more pronounced for parties with governing experience than for other parties.  
Table 1 regression models only provide information about the effect of public opinion on 
party left-right strategies for two instances: where ܩ݈݋ܾ݈ܽ݅ݖܽݐ݅݋݊௞௧ equals 0 or when it equals 1. 
Accordingly, Figure 2 uses Table 1 Model 2 estimates to chart the marginal effects of public 
opinion shifts on party shift across the sample range of values for economic globalization. The 
negative slope indicates that as globalization increases, the estimate of party responsiveness to 
the mean voter position decreases. The coefficient on ܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ ܱ݌݅݊݅݋݊ ݄݂ܵ݅ݐ௞௧ attains statistical 
significance when ܩ݈݋ܾ݈ܽ݅ݖܽݐ݅݋݊௞௧ is below 0.70 on the 0-1 rescaled index. In the remainder of 
cases—those more exposed to trade, capital flows and employing more liberal policies—our 
model estimates that changes in public opinion, as represented by the mean voter, have no statis-
tically significant influence on party shifts.  
<Figure 2 here> 
 To facilitate interpretation of the results, we briefly consider the case of France, a country 
which has grappled considerably with the wider political effects of globalization. In 1988, the 
French economy was, vis-à-vis many of its European neighbors, relatively closed from 
international trade and capital flows.  At this time, France’s KOF Globalization index equaled 
0.57.  At such a level of globalization, in terms of Model 2 estimates, the conditional coefficient 
on the ܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ ܱ݌݅݊݅݋݊ ݄݂ܵ݅ݐ௞௧ variable is 1.06 ([(1*3.65)-(.57*4.55)] = +1.06). This impact of 
public opinion substantively significant: when the mean voter’s position shifts by .30 units along 
the 0-10 scale, which represents the inter-quartile range of the public opinion shift data, the 
governing experience parties’ left-right positions tend to shift by over 6 units in the same 
direction along the 200-point left-right CMP scale. By the time of the 2007 election, the economy 
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had opened up considerably, with a KOF Globalization index of 0.75.  Given this level of 
integration, our model no longer predicts a systematic relationship between shifts in public 
opinion and shifts in the positions of such parties with governing experience as the French 
Socialists or Gaullists. The conditional coefficient on the ܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ ܱ݌݅݊݅݋݊ ݄݂ܵ݅ݐ௞௧ variable is 
also much smaller ([(1*3.65)-(.75*4.55)] = +.24), an estimate which suggests that governing 
experience parties’ left-right positions tend to shift by less than 1.5 in the same scenario 
described above.   
 
Additional Analyses 
We explored several alternative contingencies and measures to establish the robustness of 
our statistical results. One distinction which has received much attention is the behavior of niche 
parties, that is, parties which limit their issue appeals and which do not face a trade-off between 
advocating their preferred policy beliefs and moderating policies to maximize electoral support 
(Adams, Clark, Ezrow, and Glasgow 2006; Meguid 2008).  It may be that the governing 
experience effect shown in Table 1 is picking up a “mainstream” effect, i.e., globalization may 
only affect parties belonging to the Social Democratic, Conservative, Christian Democratic, or 
Liberal party families.20 We examine this conjecture by estimating models to test whether the 
parameters on the interaction term, ߚଷ in equation (1), is statistically different for mainstream and 
niche parties.  Unlike the governing experience distinction, the mainstream/niche distinction is 
found to have no effect. We also examined whether results were driven by left- and right-of-
                                                 
20 Mainstream and governing experience classifications are not synonymous: while nearly all 
parties with executive experience are mainstream, 48% of mainstream parties in our sample have 
no experience heading up governments. 
 19
center parties and by centrist relative to extremist parties. None of these distinctions matter to the 
degree that governing experience does.21 These non-findings bolster our argument that politicians 
that have headed governments are more distracted by market integration than politicians of other 
parties. (We report these analyses in the online appendix). 
Second, we consider the direct effects of globalization on party behavior.  If, as Figure 1 
implies, the preferences of market actors lie to the right of the average voter’s preferences, then 
we might expect increasing globalization to shift parties to the right, to more neoliberal policy 
positions.  A definitive test of this claim would require us to incorporate measures of economic 
elites’ preferences into our model.  Unfortunately, such data are unavailable for a sufficient 
number of cases.  We can, however, examine whether increasing globalization influences party 
shifts directly.  Model 1 in Table 2 presents these results by including the inter-election shift in 
globalization on the right hand side (߂ܩ݈݋ܾ݈ܽ݅ݖܽݐ݅݋݊௞௧).
 22  The parameter estimate is positive, 
indicating that parties tend to shift to the right when market integration increases. Our substantive 
results, however, remain unchanged.  This result is consistent with the argument that if increasing 
globalization motivates political elites to place greater weight on economic elites’ 
policy preferences at the expense of the voters’, and if the preferences of economic elites are to 
                                                 
21 In none of these cases do the F tests of the joint significance of public opinion shift, globaliza-
tion, and party type achieve statistical significance.  For the interactive model distinguishing 
mainstream parties from niche parties, F = 0.98, p = 0.40; for left parties versus non-left, F = 
2.04, p = 0.11; for right parties versus non-right, F = 1.46, p = 0.23; and for center versus ex-
treme, F = 1.11, p = 0.40. 
22 The marginal effects for these and subsequent analyses reported in this section are presented in 
Appendix Figure A1.  
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the right of the mass public, then increasing globalization should motivate parties to shift to the 
right.  
<Table 2 about here> 
Third, we consider alternative globalization indicators. In pooling information on a range 
of flows and policy decisions, the KOF Economic Globalization Index used in Table 1 provides a 
broad set of signals about the world economy’s reach. Yet different components of globalization 
may have different effects on political outcomes. Is this the case for party responsiveness? To 
investigate this issue, we re-estimated Table 1 Model 2 separating out Dreher’s indices of flows 
and restrictions.  Flows incorporate information on imports and exports of goods and services, 
foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, and income payments to foreign nationals. Re-
strictions includes information on hidden import barriers, mean tariff rates, import and export 
duties and other taxes on international trade, and capital account restrictions.23 Models 2 and 3 of 
Table 2 report estimates for flows and restrictions. Substituting these series for the more general 
globalization measure produces no change in the relationship of interest. Model 4 further narrows 
the focus by looking at trade openness alone. Results again confirm our initial findings.  Our sub-
stantive conclusions again remain unchanged. 
A fourth consideration pertains to over-time trends. Exposure of national economies to 
flows from abroad has generally, though not always, increased with time. Thus, we might be 
concerned that what appears as a globalization effect may simply be capturing a secular decline 
                                                 
23 Lower values on these restrictions contribute to higher values on the index, this reflecting 
greater liberalization. 
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in parties’ tendencies to respond to public opinion.24 To address this concern, we perform a pair 
of supplemental analyses. First, we re-estimated the parameters of the basic model specification 
including an election year variable to control for time. Secondly, we purged the globalization 
index of the time element by regressing it on election year. The residuals from this model were 
then used as a ‘de-trended’ measure of economic globalization in the basic specification. In both 
cases, shown in Table 2 Models 5-6, the results support the same conclusions as above.  
Fifth, results reported here might not be due to globalization but to the fact that in many 
European Union member states, political parties in government are formally bound to a more 
limited set of credible policy options. By including in the dataset countries that are in and outside 
of the EU, we have in part already diffused this concern (see also below).  However, if it can be 
shown that economic globalization reduces party tendencies to shift positions in response to pub-
lic opinion within EU member states, then we can take this as evidence that despite limits on their 
jurisdictional competence, variation with respect to economic globalization is driving weaker 
responsiveness rather than some aspect shared by all Member States (i.e., “Europeanization”).  
To examine this conjecture, Table 2 Model 7 reports model estimates for EU members only.  
Results do not change from those produced by the entire sample.25   
Finally, there is the question of concept measurement. One historical problem with meas-
uring party positions using the CMP data is that the estimates of party position have not been 
                                                 
24 For example, the professionalization of election campaigns may cause parties to downplay 
their responsiveness on policy grounds in favor of emphasizing other qualities with respect to 
party image or candidates for office. 
25 Note that we also attempted to examine the effects for countries that joined the Eurozone (1999 
or later) but could not due to degrees of freedom constraints.  
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published with corresponding estimates of uncertainty (Benoit, Laver, and Mikhaylov 2009). If a 
party “shifts” two units based on the CMP estimates, for example, but the uncertainty around the 
estimate is five units, then it is possible that the party did not shift in fact shift position at all. One 
way to address this concern, and consider the implications of uncertainty, is to estimate the pa-
rameters of the model specification for Table 1 Column 2 for only significant party shifts, i.e., 
shifts that are greater than the bootstrapped standard errors published by Benoit et al. (2009).26  
Table 2 Model 7 reports estimates for only significant party shifts. The estimates based on a lim-
ited number of observations (156 from 252) support our substantive results. 
 
Analyses Based on Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Data 
 We re-evaluated the findings above relying on data from Modules 1-3 of the Compara-
tive Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). Where possible we supplemented these cases with data 
from separate national election studies. For example, the CSES modules included the 1996 and 
2002 elections in New Zealand. Without data from the 1999 vote, however, information from 
these cases could not be included in the case selection. We merged in data from the intervening 
1999 New Zealand Election Study.27 In total, measures were constructed for parties’ policy ad-
                                                 
26 See http://www.kenbenoit.net/cmp/cmp-error/.  
27 Recall that data from two consecutive elections are required. We similarly supplemented 
measures from the intervening 2000 Australian, 2001 British, and 2007 Irish post-election sur-
veys. For ease, we refer to the combination of these with the CSES modules as the “CSES-based” 
analyses. 
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justments for 79 parties in 46 national elections in 15 countries between 1999 and 2009 (see 
online Appendix A.2).28   
Apart from mere replication purposes, this supplementary analysis is beneficial for three 
reasons.  First, it offers us a different way of measuring the dependent variable, party shift, by 
using information from respondent perceptions of party positions rather than relying on party 
programs.  Second, in covering the period 1999-2009, this analysis provides an additional check 
against barriers to inference owing to time effects. And third, cases included in this dataset argu-
ably provide a varied mix of experiences; for example, seven of the 15 countries are outside the 
eurozone.   
In each survey, respondents were asked to place parties on the left-right scale: “In politics 
people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place [PARTY] on a scale from 0 to 10 
where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?” The mean value of all responses to this item in a 
given election survey constitutes the parties’ overall left-right policy stance. Our measures of 
public opinion also come from the supplemented CSES data. As above, we use the overall mean 
of survey respondents’ self-placement on the 0-10 point left-right scale at the time of the election. 
                                                 
28 The 2004 Japanese election is omitted due to the absence of data on party positions. We also 
omit the 2004 Spanish election for reasons both empirical and substantive. Empirically, the mean 
voter shift in our dataset is nearly twice as great in magnitude as any other in the sample (-0.56, 
the next greatest being -0.34 for Iceland in 2009). This drastic leftward shift can be readily under-
stood in the context of the vote, which occurred just three days after the Madrid train bombings 
by terrorists, and action that removed the governing Partido Popular from power and gave an 
unexpected victory to the center-left (for evidence of unexpected nature of this result, see Bali 
2006; Montalvo 2012).  
 24
Model 8 of Table 2 reports results of this analysis, based, as previously, on governing ex-
perience parties.29  Results continue to support our finding that governing parties’ responsiveness 
to public opinion is mediated by levels of globalization. The marginal effects of the coefficient on 
ܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ ܱ݌݅݊݅݋݊ ݄݂ܵ݅ݐ௞௧ are reported in Figure 3. The similarity between Figures 2 and 3 is re-
markable in light of differences in measures of party position, sets of countries, and time-periods. 
The confidence in the reported findings is increased by leveraging these two independent sets of 
data and employing different measures of party position.   
<Figure 3 here> 
 
Conclusion 
“Can we still have the highest taxes when people more and more notice that you get a better 
salary after taxes if you move to London? Our social security system, can it survive? It gets 
harder with globalization. [Our party] has had big discussions on how we are influenced by 
politics abroad.” -- Liberal Party Member of the Danish Folketing 30 
 
While parties have incentives to respond to public opinion, we show they do so only when 
the national economy is sufficiently sheltered from world markets. As countries become more 
deeply integrated into world markets, party representatives appear less and less responsive to 
citizen preferences. Specifically, we find that, all else equal, parties with governing experience in 
countries characterized by high levels of economic globalization do not respond in kind to inter-
election shifts in the mean voter’s positions in terms of left and right.  This central finding holds, 
                                                 
29 The model includes the same measures for globalization and growth as used previously.  Due 
to the lack of three consecutive elections in all but a few cases, we are unable to include lagged 
party shifts. 
30 Interviewed in Copenhagen, March 20, 2003. 
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drawing on not one but two cross-national data sets. It holds when we rely on different defini-
tions of economic globalization, in a variety of countries, over different time periods, and for 
different measurements of party positions.  These results support our argument that globalization 
enhances the political relevance of market actors over voters, distracting political elites from the 
electorate.  
These results have fundamental implications for policy responsiveness in advanced indus-
trial democracies.  It is important, however, to be clear about what we have not shown.  First, we 
do not provide evidence that parties fail to respond in kind to voter shifts over intervals more 
abrupt than the inter-election period.31  Second, we do not provide evidence that globalization 
diminishes responsiveness to other groups of the electorate beyond the preferences of the mean 
voter.  And third, our findings do not provide evidence that globalization affects party respon-
siveness on other issues dimensions beyond left-right or, for that matter, on individual issue posi-
tions. 
This study raises many questions and opens several avenues for future research. The first 
pertains to the issue of responsiveness. While previous studies debate globalization’s effect on 
policy convergence (e.g., Garrett 1998; Jahn 2006) or on party positions (e.g., Haupt 2010; Ward 
et al. 2011), this study is the first to demonstrate the conditioning effect of globalization on mean 
voter responsiveness. The emphasis on the mean voter position is consistent with prominent re-
                                                 
31 This limitation applies to the vast majority of empirical studies of party responsiveness. Anal-
yses of party responsiveness to year-to-year shifts in public opinion remain rare, due chiefly to 
the lack of available measures of changes in party preferences from one year to the next.  Some 
have overcome this challenge by measuring party preferences through the coding of speeches 
(e.g., Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008).   
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search that also emphasizes the role of the mean voter as the starting point for democratic repre-
sentation (e.g. Downs 1957; McDonald and Budge 2005; Powell 2000; Stimson et al. 1995).  
Although the use of the mean voter is justified by a long tradition of research in spatial modeling 
and public opinion research which holds that capturing the preferences of the mean (or median) is 
fundamental to the party’s electoral success, to the extent that issue preferences among the elec-
torate vary or are “multi-peaked” then future studies should examine party responsiveness to spe-
cific groups within the electorate, such as opinion leaders (e.g., Adams and Ezrow 2009), high 
sophisticates (e.g., Gomez and Wilson 2001), or high-income earners (e.g., Bartels 2008).  It may 
well be that by creating new groups of “winners” and “losers” (Rodrik 1997), globalization cre-
ates incentives for parties to appeal to specific groups on which their success most depends. 
A second question pertains to how scholars conceive of substantive representation (Pitkin 
1967). Our use of the left-right superdimension as a summary of voters’ preferences is deliberate: 
In established party systems, the language of “left” and “right” summarizes issue positions better 
than any other. But it is also possible that globalization contributes to a reduction in the relative 
saliency of the left-right dimension. With respect to this point, scholars have emphasized the rel-
evance of an additional issue dimension. As evinced by its labels of green/alternative/libertarian - 
traditional/authoritarian/nationalism (Marks, Hooghe, Nelson, and Edwards 2006) and integra-
tion-demarcation (Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier, and Frey 2008), the salience of 
this alternative structuring dimension may be associated with economic globalization. Insights 
from this research on the multidimensional nature of party competition in advanced capitalist 
democracies should be incorporated into future research on the determinants of party responsive-
ness. 
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Thirdly, in showing how globalization’s impact is driven by parties with executive expe-
rience, this study adds to and advances scholarship on the diversity of party strategies.  As others 
have shown, when it comes to mean voter responsiveness, all parties are not the same (Adams et 
al. 2006; Adams and Ezrow 2009).  Particularly relevant is Andrews and Money’s (2009) distinc-
tion between “champions” and “challengers”—that is, parties that have been a part of a governing 
coalition at one time and those that have not. Andrews and Money (2009) find that challengers 
gain votes by adopting a strategy of policy extremism, while champions enhance their electoral 
support via a strategy of policy moderation. To the extent that we employ a similar typology that 
stratifies parties based on governing experience, it suggests that economic globalization con-
strains champions from responding to shifts in the mean voter position, and that challengers are 
not similarly constrained.  
Fourthly, a similar analysis is in the offing of policy outcomes and, in particular, whether 
the election promises of parties are implemented.32 Research on policy responsiveness finds that 
the preferences of the median voter work through parties’ policy positions to affect levels of pub-
lic spending (Kang and Powell 2010). Naurin (2011: Chapter 4) similarly finds that governing 
parties, on the whole, do tend to carry out their campaign promises if they are fortunate enough to 
reach government. Although our study suggests that globalization mediates (diminishes) these 
linkages—from citizen preferences to public policy, or from campaign promises to enacted poli-
cy—direct analysis of them would be worthwhile.33  
                                                 
32 We acknowledge a reviewer for raising the point that economic globalization may specifically 
influence the ability of governing parties to implement their election promises. 
33 In the online appendix, we present evidence that suggests globalization conditions the influ-
ence of public opinion shifts on policy outcomes.  
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Our empirical findings represent a crucial step for understanding the linkage between 
public opinion and party ideologies, under different levels of market integration. While we now 
know a great deal about the extent to which trade and capital flows shape public spending and 
policy choices, there is much work to be done on globalization and “politics” more broadly de-
fined.  We thus agree with Kayser (2007, 341) that “the sheer volume” of literature on globaliza-
tion has made it easy to overlook the fact that “very little of it addresses the effect of economic 
globalization on actual politics.” In this contribution, we have provided evidence that political 
parties with governing experience do not respond systematically to citizen demands in open 
economies. 
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Figure A1: Conditional Effects Graphs, corresponding to Models 1-7 in Table 2 
Notes: Figures chart the estimated coeffi-
cient on public opinion shift on party posi-
tion shifts over values of globalization based 
on estimates provided in Table 2, model 
numbers 1-8 (graph number corresponds to 
the regression model number). We recali-
brate both the party positions and public 
opinion measures to fit on a 0-10 scale. 
Dashed lines report 90% confidence inter-
vals. 
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8. Statistically Significant Shifts
 38
Figure 1. Ideological Bias between Economic Elites and Mass Publics, 2007 
 
 
 
Notes. Data are from the IntUne project (www.intune.it). Columns report the mean self-
placements of economic elites minus the mean self-placement in the electorate, on a 0-10 Left-
Right scale. Positive values indicate that economic elites are, on average, more right-wing than 
the electorate. Based on the difference of means tests, all of the differences are statistically signif-
icant at the .05 level, except for Greece (p = .07) and Italy (.30).  
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Figure 2. Effect of Public Opinion Shift on Party Shift Conditional on  
Economic Globalization for Parties with Governing Experience 
 
Notes: Figure charts the estimated coefficient on public opinion shift on party position shifts over 
values of the economic globalization index, as provided by Table 1 Model 2 estimates. The glob-
alization index is rescaled from 0-100 to 0-1. Dashed lines report 90% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 3. Effect of Public Opinion Shift on Party Shift Conditional on  
Economic Globalization, CSES-Based Sample  
 
 
 
Notes: Figure charts the estimated coefficient on public opinion shift on party position shifts over 
values of the economic globalization index, as provided by Table 2 Model 9 estimates. The glob-
alization index is rescaled from 0-100 to 0-1. Dashed lines report 90% confidence intervals. 
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Table 1. Multivariate Analyses of Parties’ Left-Right Policy Shifts in 18 Democracies,  
1977-2009 
 
 All Parties  
  
(1) 
Governing 
experiencea 
 (2) 
No Governing 
experience 
(3) 
PUBLIC OPINION SHIFTkt 
 
0.60 
(1.13) 
3.65** 
(1.31) 
-1.42 
(1.08) 
GLOBALIZATIONkt -1.45* 
(0.84) 
-1.66 
(1.03) 
-1.47 
(0.93) 
PUBLIC OPINION SHIFTkt x  
GLOBALIZATIONkt  
-0.77 
(1.44) 
-4.55** 
(1.60) 
1.75 
(1.39) 
∆GROWTHkt 
 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
PARTY SHIFTjkt-1  -0.45** 
(0.05) 
-0.39** 
(0.07) 
-0.50** 
(0.07) 
Constant 0.75 
(0.60) 
0.47 
(0.91) 
-0.14 
(0.81) 
N 580 252 328 
R2 .23 .24 .29 
 
Notes. Dependent variable is PARTY SHIFTjkt. Robust standard errors clustered by election are in paren-
theses. *p < .10, **p < .05, two-tailed test (unconditional estimates); The estimates of public opinion and 
party position have been recalibrated to a 0-10 scale. The models are estimated with country-specific inter-
cepts.   
a. “Governing experience” refers to those parties in the dataset which have experience as the largest part-
ner in a governing coalition or have governed with a single party majority or minority. 
 
 
 
  
 42
Table 2. Multivariate Analyses of Left-Right Policy Shifts for Parties with Governing Experience, Additional Models 
 
 
Shifts 
in Glob. 
KOF 
Flows 
KOF 
Restrictions 
Trade Election 
Year control 
Detrended 
globaliza-
tion 
EU Member 
States 
Significant 
Shifts 
CSES-based 
sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
PUBLIC OPINION 
SHIFTkt 
 
3.62** 
(1.40) 
1.95** 
(0.89) 
6.76** 
(1.91) 
0.78 
(0.53) 
3.48** 
(1.30) 
0.03 
(0.26) 
4.23** 
(1.23) 
4.85** 
(1.92) 
4.73* 
(2.33) 
GLOBALIZATIONkt -1.79* 
(0.99) 
-1.28* 
(0.70) 
-0.92 
(1.18) 
-0.37 
(0.40) 
0.77 
(1.89) 
-0.17 
(2.07) 
-1.49 
(1.01) 
-1.93 
(1.61) 
-3.72* 
(2.18) 
PUBLIC OPINION 
SHIFTkt x  
GLOBALIZATIONkt  
 
-4.57** 
(1.71) 
-2.65** 
(1.14) 
-7.79** 
(2.22) 
-0.88* 
(0.47) 
-4.37** 
(1.59) 
-4.05* 
(2.28) 
-4.97** 
(1.50) 
-6.30** 
(2.69) 
-5.26* 
(2.69) 
∆GROWTHkt 
 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
 
PARTY SHIFTjkt-1 -0.39** 
(0.07) 
-0.39** 
(0.07) 
-0.38** 
(0.07) 
-0.41** 
(0.07) 
-0.40** 
(0.07) 
-0.39** 
(0.07) 
-0.35** 
(0.08) 
-0.54** 
(0.09) 
 
∆GLOBALIZATIONkt 3.57* 
(2.07) 
        
YEARkt      -0.02* 
(0.01) 
    
Constant 1.73* 
(0.97) 
0.09 
(0.59) 
-0.16 
(1.08) 
-0.60 
(0.54) 
38.59* 
(20.08) 
-0.98** 
(0.16) 
0.34 
(0.88) 
1.69 
(1.31) 
3.61* 
(1.77) 
N 252 252 252 270 252 252 218 156 78 
R2  .25 .24 .24 .19 .25 .22 .23 .33 .18 
Notes. Dependent variable is PARTY SHIFTjkt. Robust standard errors clustered by election are in parentheses. All models estimated with coun-
try-specific intercepts. *p < .10, **p < .05, two-tailed test, unconditional coefficients.  
 
 
 
